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The Governmental Context for Natural Resource Development in
Indian Country

Susan M. Williams, Gover, Stetson & Williams, Albuquerque!

No doubt any longer exists that the major force
development of
government.

Indian natural

in the

resources will be the tribal

That government both owns natural resources and

regulates their development.
Against an historical,
pr~sentation

legal and political backdrop,

this

focuses on the issues facing modern tribal govern-

ments in their quest, responsibly and comprehensively, to manage
the development of reservation resources.

I.

Overview

From the earliest years of · the Republic, Indian tribes were
recognized as "distinct,
Worcester v. Georgia,

independent, political communi ties,
6

Pet. 515,

559

(1832)

and,

11

as such,

qualified to exercise powers of government, not by virtue of any
delegation from the federal government, but rather, by reason of
tribes'

original

inherent sovereignty.

Consistent with this

doctrine, until recently, courts reviewing the nature of Indian
tribal powers adhered to three ·fundamental principles:

(1)

An

Indian tribe possesses, in · the first instance, all of the powers
of any sovereign state;

(2) Conquest of the tribes by the United

l
This article was originally prepared for the June 1988
NRLC conference, "Natural Resource Development in Indian Country."

States rendered tribes subject to the legislative power of the
United States and, in so doing, terminated the external powers of
sovereignty of the

tribes,

such as the power to enter

treaties with foreign nations.

into

The loss of external sovereignty,

however, did not affect the internal sovereignty of the tribes,
that is the powers of local government;

(3) Tribal powers may be

qualified by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but
except where expressly qualified,

the full powers of internal

sovereignty remained vested in the Indian tribes and their duly
constituted organs of government.
Over

the years Congress has vacillated widely

in

its

legislation on 'Indian matters ranging from termination of the
political existence of certain Indian

tribes to efforts to

support the strengthening of tribal governments.
ly,

But, important-

until the 1950's, Congress did not derogate the sovereign

powers of
enacted

Indian tribes.

In the 1950's, however,

Congress

legislation authorizing state authority over Indian

reservations in such areas as education, and health and welfare.
In addition, Congress enacted Public Law 280, which curtailed
federal

responsibilities on certain Indian reservations by

transferring criminal and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over
Indian Country from the federal government to the states.
states were given the option of assuming
reservations on their own.

Other

jurisdiction over

Because of longstanding and continu-

ing tension between states and tribes, these federal policies
proved extremely detrimental to tribal interests.
2

From the 1960's to the present, Congress abandoned the
policy of permitting state jurisdiction over reservations in

of a policy of strengthening tribal governments.

favor

Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act which

In 1968,
imposed

constitutional-type limitations on the exercise of tribal
sovereign powers .
h~wever ,

Congress authorized only tribal

forums ,

to hear claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act, except

for habeus corpus claims which are authorized to be heard in the
federal

courts.

In 1974,

the Indian Self- Determination and

Education · Assistance Act was enacted to authorize tribes to
contract . with the Interior and Health & Human Services Secretaries to operate federal programs for their reservations.
1980's, amendments to the Interna l

In the

Revenue Code and to the

Nation ' s air and water quality protection programs authorize
treatment of tribes as states for purposes of these laws which
authorize tax benefits and federal grants for governments.
short ,

In

in the last few years , Congress has given tribal govern-

ments critically needed recognition and financial assistance.
Courts, in contrast , have rendered decisions in r ecent years
which depart from the Worcester v. Georgia mandate that tribes be
treated as sovereigns with powers exclusive as against states
with respect to reservation affairs.
directly at the heart of tribes•

These decisions have struck

internal sovereign powers ,

by

seizing from tribes the jurisdiction to prosecute and convict
non- Indians on their reservations,

and jurisdiction over non-

Indians on fee lands within their reservations , except where
3

the non-Indians'

conduct threatens the political or economic

integrity, or health and welfare of the tribe.
employed the theory tpa t

The courts have

powers of cr im in~l jurisdiction and

jurisdiction over non-members on fee lands are inconsistent with
tribes' dependent . status.

Im.portantly, however, in the applica-

tion of these rules, the courts have found ·only in one instance
that tribal powers exercised over

non-Indians on fee

lands

within the reservations are inconsistent with tribes' dependent
status.

The decisions also have struck indirectly at the heart

of tribes'

internal sovereign powers,

in upholding state juris-

diction over reservation matters in certain instances.
In the most recent decision regarding the scope of state
jurisdiction over Indian lands, the

u.s.

Supreme Court has made

clear that only in the area of state taxation does a per se rule
exist

that states lack

jurisdiction over

reservations, absent congressional consent.

Indians on their

With respect to all

other state jurisdictional exercises over Indians and non-Indians
in Indian territory, the courts will employ the federal doctrines
of preemption and

infringement upon tribal

self-government

against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty to determine whether
sufficient

stat~

interests are at stake to outweigh the federal

interests at stake.

In thus opening the door, to some extent, to

state jurisdiction on reservations, the courts cavalierly and
perhaps unwittingly have fanned historic and deeply-felt tensions
between states and tribes at a

time when great diplomacy and

cooperation between states and tribes are critical to the protec4

tion of natural resources ,

the environment and the i nte r est of

citi2ens on and near the reservations .

But , more importantly,

the courts have abandoned the framers ' intent embodied in Article
1 Section 8 of the U. S . Constitution that the federal government
functions as the paramount authority over Indian affairs, and not
states, and that Congress and not the courts derive the delicate
balance between federa l and tribal interests on the one hand , and
state interests on the other hand , with respect to activities on
Indian reservations.

And, ultimately, that balance ought best to

be derived by the tribes and the states pursuant to intergovernmental agreements.

Any other approach necessarily will have the

effect of destroying meaningful tribal governments.
With respect to federal authority over reservations , courts
have held that Congress has " plenary power" over Indian tribes ,
/

pursuant to
another

the

presentation and under Article 1 Section 8 of the

Constitution.
held

trust responsibility doctrine discussed

While

in

the early years,

u.s .

plenary power was

to be virtually an unreviewable power,

decisions ,

in

in more recent

courts have made clear that the plenary power means

Congress has paramount authority over tribes , but that authority
must be exercised consistent with Congress' unique obligations to
Indian tribes .

Federal courts ,

authority over .disputes

in contrast,

have · limited

involving Indian tribes .

supreme Court has held, for example,

The

u.S .

that federal courts must

defer to t r ibal courts to determine the scope of tribal jurisdiction under federal and tribal law.
5

The Court also has held that

challenges to the exercise of tribal jurisdiction must be heard
in tribal and not federal forums.

II .

Tribal sovereign Powers
A. Statutes

In -the late 1800 • s, Congress executed a number of treaties
with Indian tribes, which treaties approved cessions of vast
Indian land areas in exchange for federal promises of education
and welfare programs for Indians and exclusively tribal
tories in the United States.

terri-

Soon after the close of the treaty

period in the late 1800's, however, Congress enacted the General
Allotment Act of ·1887,

(25

u.s.c.

331, et. seq . ) pursuant to

which tribal lands were distributed to the adult members of the
tribes , which members were authorized to sell their land after a
certain period.

The goal of the Act was to transform Indian

societies into farming and industrial economies.

Vast portions

of Indian lands remaining after -distribution were deemed to be
"surplus" and open to non-Indian settlement.

During this period

approximately two-thirds of the tribal land base was lost to
sales of the surplus lands , tax sales and sales of the individually owned tribal lands .
The Act,
powers.
(25

importantly, did not attack tribal

sovereign

In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act,

u.s.c.

461, et. seq . ) which authorized a procedure for tribes

to enact constitutions for their tribal governments, and recognized tribes as appropriate vehicles for
6

implementing federal

Indian policies.

This Act was the first congressional recogni-

tion of the right of Indian people to maintain distinct, political communities.
In the 1950's, however, Congress reversed its policy of the
strengthening of tribal gov,e rnments by enacting legislation which
authorized the termination of the political existence of certain
tribes, and the assimilation of individual Indians into state
society.

In 1955, Congress enacted Public Law 280,

Sect. 1162, 25
1360 note)

u.s.c.

Sects. 1321-1326, 28

u.s.c.

(18

u.s.c.

Sects. 1360,

which curtailed federal responsibilities on certain

Indian reservations by transferring criminal and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian Country from the federal government
to the states.

Some states were given the option of assuming

jurisdiction over reservation areas on their own.

Not until

l96S, however, was a requirement imposed of tribal consent to the
acquisition of such jurisdiction.

In other 1950's legislation

Congress transferred certain responsibilities to states for
health and education of Indians (25

u.s.c.

the

Sect. 231).

In. the 1960's, the federal termination pol icy was reversed
by the continuing federal policy of strengthening tribal governments and promoting the development of
economies.

Indian reservation

Through a series of legislative enactments, including

the Indian Self-Determination Education Assistance Act of 1974,
(25

U.s.c.

Sects. 450-450n, 455-458c), the Indian Financing Act

of 1974, (25

u.s.c.

Sects. 1451-1453), the Indian Tribal Govern-

ment Tax Status Act of 1982,

(26
7

u.s.c.

Sect. 7871), the Safe

Drinking Water Act of 1987 and the Clean Water Act of 1988,
Congress has enacted laws which put great force behind these
policies.

The Self-Determination Act permits. tribes to contract

with the federal government to operate federal programs for their
reservations.

The Financing Act authorizes loans, grants and

loan guarantees to Indian tribes and tribal organizations for
economic development.

The Tax Status Act accords to tribes

certain federal tax immunities and the authority to issue debt
obligations, the interest on which is tax exempt.

All of these

enactments are critical stepping stones for tribes to enter the
modern era of tribal governments.

The Water Acts treat tribes as

states for purposes of designing and managing federally-subsidized water quality protection programs.

B. Judicial Decisions
In Worcester

u.s.

v. Georgia,

6

Pet. 515, 559

(1832),

the

Supreme Court described Indian tribes as distinct, indepen-

dent and political communities.

In holding that the state of

Georgia did not have jurisdiction to
Cherokee reservation,

regul~te

the Court noted,

non-Indians on the .

"the Cherokee Nation,

then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory with
boundaries

~ccurately

described, in which the laws of Georgia can

have no force, in which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves,
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.

or

in
The

whole intercourse between the United States and this Nation, is,
8

by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the
United States • • • " 6 Pet. at 560-561.

!!!_,

Consistent with Worces-

in 1872 in Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947

appeal dismissed,

203

u.s.

599

(1906)),

(8th Cir. 1405,

the Supreme Court

affirmed the right of tribes to impose taxes upon non-Indians in
the tribal territories.

In 1934, the Solicitor for the Depart-

ment of the Interior issued an opinion entitled "The Powers of
Indian Tribes," which opinion made clear that Indian tribes have
extensive powers over their own territories, including powers
over non-Indians who reside or conduct business in those territories.

The Solicitor also made clear that tribes possess all of

their aboriginal sovereign powers except those removed expressly
by Congress.

~'

55 I .D. 14 (1934).

From 1934 until

the late 1970's, however, the courts had

little opportunity to opine on the powers of Indian tribes.

When

they did,

the courts departed radically from the worcester

doctrine.

In 1978, the

u.s.

Supreme Court ruled that Indian

tribes, by virtue of their dependent status, impliedly have lost
the power to prosecute and convict non-Indians on their reservations.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435

u.s.

191 (1978).
I

In 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that the tribes may regulate
non-Indians on fee lands within their reservations only where the
activities of the non-Indians are based on consensual relationships with the tribes or whose conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe.
9

See, Montana v. United

States ,

450

u.s.

544

(1981).

cantly, courts have upheld

Under the Montana test ,
extensive

non-Indians even on fee lands on the

v. DeLaCruz, 671 F . 2d. 363, ' 9th Cir.

u.s.

967

(1982).

tribal powers

reserva~ions

power to impose health regulations.

sign ifi-

~'

over

such as the

for example , Cardin

(1981)

cert . denied, 459

In 1982, the Supreme Court ruled that tribes

have the inherent sovereign power to tax non- Indian oil and gas
lessees on the tribal lands .
455

u.s.

130 (1982) .

Merrion v . Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

In sum, the courts have ruled that tribal

sovereign powers extend broadly over both Indians and non- Indians
on the reservations.

Tribal : sovereignty , however ,

is rendered

meaningless to the ··.extent that the United States supervises that
sovereignty, and if state governments are to exercise competing
jurisdiction on the reservations.

State Sover eign Powers
A.

Congr essional Enactment s

Congress , as noted above , in the 1950 ' s , enacted legislation
which had the effect of authorizing
tory and criminal

transf~rs

of civil adjudica-

jurisdiction from the federal government to

state governments, and of state authority over certain education
and health matters on the reservations.

But before and since

that time, Congress ' pol icy has been to support the strengthening
of triba l

governments and development of I ndian reservation

economies and not to authorize state jurisdiction on the reservations.
10

B.

Judicial Decisions

In Worcester v. Georgia, the foundation of Indian law, the

u.s.

Supreme Court held that states have no jurisdiction on

Indian reservations.

From Worcester in 1832 to the 1950's,

however, the Court had no opportunity to rule again on the scope
of state powers over Indian reservations.

In 1958, the

u.s.

Su-

preme Court ruled that state courts lack the jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputes involving Indian defendants on the reservation,

because such

jurisdiction would

infringe upon

tribal

self-government in conflict with federal law and policy.
Williams · v. tee, 358

u.s.

217,

(1959).

~,

Importantly, in reaching

its decision in Williams, the Supreme Court did not rely upon the
per se rule articulated in Worcester, that is that the states
have no jurisdiction on the reservations absent congressional
consent.

Instead, the Court analyzed the relevant treaties and

federal policies to determine that the particular state jurisdiction sought to be exercised is in conflict with federal law.
In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled states lack jurisdiction to
tax Indians on their reservations.
State Tax Commission, 484 F.2d. 221
(1973).

Again,

~, . McClanahan

(1971),

~·

v. Arizona

411

u.s.

164

in McClanahan, the Court did not adopt a per se

rule that state jurisdiction does not exist absent congressional
consent.

Instead, the Court looked to the relevant treaties and

laws to determine that state taxation of Indians on reservations
was in conflict with the relevant treaty and federal laws.

11

State jurisdiction over non-Indians is subject _to a similar
analysis of the governing federal laws and treaty.

In Warren

Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 u.s. 685
(1965), the supreme Court ruled invalid

sta~e

sales taxes imposed

on non-Indian traders on reservations on the ground that such
taxes are preempted by the pervasive federal laws and regulations
governing traders.

The Court reasoned that state taxes would

interfere with the purpose of the pervasive federal regulation,
which is to ensure that Indians are charged fair prices.
In the 1980's, the Court on several occasions reviewed
state assertions of jurisdiction - over Indian reservations ••

In .

most of these decisions, the Court held that federal law precluded states from taxing even non-Indians on the reservations.

In

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 488 u.s . 136 (1980}, for
example, the Court invalidated Arizona's motor carrier license
and fuel use taxes as applied to a non-Indian enterprise that had
a logging contract with a tribally owned enterprise.
declared that where a state asserts authority over

The Court

non-Indian~

on

a reservation in a fashion that conflicts wi.th federally protected Indian interests, the state jurisdiction must fail unless
countervailing state interests are shown.
Court found

~he

In White Mountain, the

federal regulatory scheme governing the harvest-

ing of tribal timber comprehensive and pervasive, and devoted to
the maximizing of tribal timber receipts.

State taxes, the Court

reasoned, would undermine that federal purpose.

The Court then

analyzed the state interests at stake and found that the state
12

interests were marginal because the state did not provide
governmental services on the reservation to the taxpayers.

The

Court then balanced the state interests against the federal and
tribal interests and concluded that the state taxes must be
preempted under federal law because the balance tipped in favor
of the federal and tribal interests.
In washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 100
2069

(1980),

in contrast,

the Couxt held

~he

s.

ct.

state may tax

non-Indian purchasers of cigaxettes from Indian retailers,
because no federal pervasive regulations, no federal interests,
and no re's ervation-generated value were at stake.

In short, in

balance, the state interests were weightier because the Indians
essentially were marketing only tax exemptions.
Thus, at . least until 1987, the general rules appeared to be
that state jurisdiction over non-Indians on a reservation did not
exist unless the state could show that it had sufficient interests at stake,

such as governmental services provided to the

reservation taxpayers, and that competing federal and tribal laws
and policies wexe not endangered.

State

jurisdiction over

Indians on a reservation, in contrast, did not lie in the absence
of express federal consent.
In 1987, however, the

u.s.

Supreme Court rendered a landmark

decision that appears to have turned these longstanding rules on
their head.
107

s.

In California v. California Band of Mission Indians,

Ct. 1083

(1987), the Court ruled that in the absence of

express congressional consent and except for the area of state
13

taxation

(where the worcester rule remains applicable), state

civil regulatory jurisdiction over even tribes and tribal members
on their reservations turns on whether

state authority is

preempted by operation of federal law or infringes upon the right
of self-government.

In other words, state jurisdiction over

Indians is not per se invalid but will turn on the balance of
governmental
strong

interests.

federal

In Cabazon,

and tribal

the Court liberally found

interests and concluded that

the

application of California statutes and regulations to tribally-owned bingo enterprises infringed
government and,

impermissibly on

tribal

in light of ~ the federal policy of Indian self-

-determination and tribal economic development, was preempted by
federal law.

The state, importantly, could point to no services

delivered to the tribal bingo enterprises or any other interest.
Query how state taxing jurisdiction over Indians is any more
detriment~!

over

than any other form of state regulatory jurisdiction

Indians · on a

reservation.

A per se rule would appear

appropriate for all forms of state civil regulatory jurisdiction
over Indians on the reservations.
In 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion, a 9th
Circuit decision holding that the state of Montana could not
impose high severance and gross proceeds taxes on coal mined by a
non-Indian company on the Crow Reservation.
taxes

impeded

production and sales,

The Court found the

thereby impairing

the

congressional objectives of encouraging maximum tribal benefits
from the tribal coal and tribal self-government and economic
14

development.

Under the balancing test, the state could point to

no services or other state interest sufficient to support the tax
and accordingly, the Court concluded the taxes must fail because
they infringed impermissibly upon the tribe's ability to raise
revenues for government and economic development.

~'

~

Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819, F.2d. 895, 9th Cir. (1987),
affirmed without opinion, 56

u.s.L.W.

3450, (1988).

At the current time, yet another theory for limiting state
jurisdiction over even non-Indians on a . reservation, may be
tested in the

u.s.

Supreme Court.

In Cotton Petroleum v. State

of New Mexico, the non-Indian oil and gas lessees in the Jicarilla Apache Reservation have sought review of a New Mexico Court of
Appeals decision which holds that the interstate commerce clause
does not preclude the State of New Mexico's taxing Cotton's
~everance

five

of oil and gas from the reservation at a rate of about

times

the value of

services delivered back to Cotton

Petroleum on the reservation.

The foundation for the claim is

that tribes can be treated as states for purposes of the interstate commerce clause and accordingly, the . State of New Mexico
and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe must apportion between the two
taxes imposed on Cotton Petroleum.

The Court has noted probable

jurisdiction and has requested briefs on whether tribes can be
treated as states for purposes of the
clause.

interstate commerce

Tribes are opposed vigorously to

this case on the

grounds that the Indian commerce clause, which historically has
been a shield against state taxation, is the proper theory of the
15

case.

Cotton also has claimed in its brief to the Court that

Federal preemption grounds exist as a bar to the state tax.
In sum, while the Court has usurped the congressional role
deciding the delicate question of whether state jurisdiction
should lie on reservations in particular cases, the Court is
applying the Federal preemption test employed for this purpose in
a

liberal

fashion

in favor of tribes.

Cotton is a

test of

whether this trend will continue with the new Court.2

III. Federal Power
The United States has a trust responsibility in the management of Indian assets, based on the federal ownership of the
legal title to Indian lands, and the Indian commerce clause of
the

u.s.

Constitution, and many statutes enacted by Congress

articulating the trust responsibility.

Congress also has been

held by courts to have plenary power over Indian tribes.

The

scope of federal power and restraints on it are critical questions for tribal governments.

In the early days, the courts

viewed the plenary power as equivalent to

~he

power of Congress

over matters involving foreign states, a power that is virtually
unreviewable.

In more recent times, however, the courts have

held the Congress accountable under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to legislate with respect to Indian tribes in a
2

An alternate barrier to state taxes is a claim that the
infringe upon tribal self-government.
See, Williams
v. Lee.
The Supreme Court, however, has not decided a case on
this ground since Williams.
t~xes

16

manner that is tied rationally to Congress' unique obligation to
Indians.

u.s.

Delaware Tribal Business Community v. weeks,

430

73, 83-85 (1977).
In recognition of the federal policy of supporting tribal

self-government, the

u.s.

Supreme Court has held that federal

courts must defer to tribal courts to determine the scope of
tribal

jurisdiction under federal and tribal law.

Farmers Life Insurance Company v. Crow Tribe,
(1985).

471

National

u.s.

845

And, moreover, courts have held t -hat the exercise of

tribal jurisdiction that is valid under federal and tribal law is
~,

not subject to review in the federal courts.
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436

u.s.

Santa Clara

40 {1978).

In the next few years the increasing tension between the
conflicting objectives of more aggressive federal management of
trust assets and tribal self-determination may yield a redefinition of the federal role in Indian affairs.

Perhaps that role

will be execution of the trust so as to equip tribes to manage
their own resources.

IV.

Building Hodern ' Tribal Government Institutions
Due to the historic wildly fluctuating

federal

Indian

policies--varying from terminating the existence of Indian tribes
to supporting the strengthening of tribal governments--modern
tribal government institutions, in a real sense, are in infancy.
The tribes, as a direct result, face numerous obstacles as they
attempt to design modern tribal government institutions and
17

implement the tribes' inherent sovereign powers.

Critical during

this era is the exercise of sovereign powers so as to preclude
the intrusion of unwanted state and other government jurisdiction
in tribal reservation matters and to regiin the role of tribes as
I

the paramount sovereign on the reservations.
government institutions , however,

In developing

tribes are being careful to

design institutions that fit the tribal societies' cultures and
limitations, and which have the ability of interacting productively with surrounding governments.

V.

Obstacles
A. Jurisdictional Dncertainties
I

As this article has shown,

tribal powers over the reserva-

tions are quite broad, although some uncertainty remains where
jurisdic t ion over non-Indians on fee lands
exercised.

is sought to be

The major source of uncertainty, however, is the

specter o f competing state jurisdiction, which specter will
lessen over time as tribal governments mature and, as a result,
tribal services are delivered and tribal regulation supplants
state regulation.

B. Federal Intrusions
Many tribes have no constitutions to confirm delegations of
certain inherent sovereign powers by the tribal people to a
tribal government.

For other

tribes,

tribal constitutions

adopted pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act, which consti18

tutions were drafted

in boiler plate form and promoted by

Interior Department officials,
tribal government ~

are extremely undermining of

These constitutions typically vest extensive

control over tribal government enactments in the Secretary of the
Interior and limit the powers of tribes with respect to non-members.

None of these limitations were required by the Indian

Reorganization Act or other law, and now many tribes must amend
tribal constitutions to reflect better the true sovereign status
of tribes.

Amending such constitutions; however,

is a

very

formidable task.

c.

Instabilities

Tribes are viewed by many as unstable in light of the rapid
turnover in ' tribal leadership.
due

In part, this rapid turnover is

to

the constitutions which have been imposed upon the

tribes.

In another sense, the tribal people have little appre-

ciation of the need for more stable government.
tion, however,

is growing.

That apprecia-

In addition, tribal economies are

based largely on federal and tribal government programs.

To the

extent a private economy exists, it typically is based on one
natural resource base or another singular economic activity.
Accordingly, tribal economies are very vulnerable to outside
influences such as changes in the prices of oil or changes in
federal policy.

Tribes need to diversify their economies and

promote more or non-federally based economies.

19

n

D. Reconstruction
Few tribes have a private economy on the reservations which

provide a needed tax base; federal · funds are drying up rapidly.
Accordingly , tribes are

face~

with the twin needs of producing a

private economy upon which taxes can be levied to provide
essential governmental services and the tribal institutions
needed to shepherd the tribal economies.
In structuring modern tribal government institutions, tribes
start with virtually nothing.

Mos~

a 1 im i ted executive branch.

Increasingly, tribes are adopting

tribes have a legislature and

their own tribal courts and supplanting so-called code of federal
regulations courts, which essentially are federal instrumentalities.

On the one hand, starting with nothing means many hills

are yet to be climbed; on t h e other hand, tribes have the unique
opportunity of learning from the mistakes of states and local
governments in designing modern tribal governmental institutions
that address the priority needs of the Indian tribes.

20

VI.

Opportunities
In establishing modern tribal governmental institutions,

tribes have the benefit of several recent congressional enactments which provide valuable federal tax benefits for tribal
government activities, and that provide tribes with opportunities
to obtain valuable federal financing to create enterprises and
water quality protection programs on their reservations.
Indian Financing Act of 1974,

~,

Indian Tribal Governmental Tax

Status Act of 1982, Clean water Act o£ 1987, and the Safe
Drinking Water Act of 1987.
moreover,

Congress at the present time,

is considering legislation which would provide addi-

tional valuable federal

tax benefits to economic development

activities on Indian reservations and
federal

that would provide a

institution with the ability to lend financing and buy

equities to promote tribal economies.

~,

Indian Economic

Development Act, 1987, pending, and Indian Finance Development
Corporation Act of 1987, pending.

Tribes and Indian-owned

enterprises also enjoy valuable state and federal tax immunities
that make reservation development more attractive.

VII. conclusion
In designing modern tribal government institutions and in
exercising tribes' inherent sovereign powers, tribes increasingly
are

taking

reservations.

over

the responsibilities of governance on the

In addition, tribes increasingly are interested in

having something to say about federal supervision of tribal trust
21

assets.

The primary objective of tribal governments in the next

decade will be to achieve the status as the primary sovereign on
the reservations.
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